RESPONSE

Date

30/12/2022

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Swedish Accident Investigation Authority Box 6014 102 31 Stockholm

Your workplace, administrator

Deputy Director-General

Jonas Bäckstrand

Our workplace, administrator HKV LEDS INRI Anders Stach,

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Your date

07/03/2022

5-200/20

Your designation

Our previous date 15/12/2022 Our preceding designation FM2022-26159:4

The Swedish Armed Forces' response to the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (2 appendices)

Background

As a result of an ongoing investigation, the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) has posed a number of questions to the Swedish Armed Forces concerning the sinking of M/S Estonia and has also asked for access to certain documentation held by the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces has searched all of its archives in order to find the material required to answer the questions from SHK. The sinking of M/S Estonia was a long time ago and the Armed Forces is currently storing only a few documents that have a link to this occurrence. Many older documents in the Armed Forces' archives have been handed over to the Military Archives of Sweden (Krigsarkivet). Those documents that are being stored in the Armed Forces' archives mainly concern the request to release official documents connected to the sinking of M/S Estonia.

The Armed Forces has also studied *Utredning om transport av försvarsmaterial på M/S Estonia* [Inquiry into the Transportation of Defence Materiel on M/S Estonia] (Fö 2004:06). However, there are no documents stored in the authority's archives that can be deemed to constitute a basis for this investigation.

In addition, the Armed Forces has obtained from the Military Archives a number of documents from the Estonia collection in order to investigate whether the content of these documents has the potential to contribute to the response from the Armed Forces. Having studied these documents, the Armed Forces is able to conclude that these do not concern SHK's questions below.

Some of the questions below concern the transportation of military materiel. Over the period 1993–2003, the Armed Forces was involved in a Swedish military aid programme the aim of which was to support the Baltic states – Project Baltstöd. Aside from materiel that was transferred to the Baltic countries, the project also included mine clearance and extensive training programmes. Despite searches of

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the Armed Forces' archive, it has not been possible to obtain information about which vessels were used to implement Project Baltstöd. Accordingly, the responses to the questions below do not take aim at the transportation of military material within the scope of this project.

This response replaces the response of the Armed Forces of the 15 December 2022 due to the fact that appendix 1 has been updated.

SHK's questions and the Swedish Armed Forces' responses

With regard to questions 5–6 and 8–10 (the Armed Forces' numbering), the Armed Forces would like to point out that the answer to the question of whether the Armed Forces' military intelligence and security service (MUST) holds information is normally that the authority is able to neither confirm nor deny the existence of such information, citing the secrecy of such information pursuant to Chapter 15, Section 2 of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400). In this case, the Armed Forces is, however, choosing to openly report the requested information in order to contribute to making it clear to the general public what information the Armed Forces has about M/S Estonia.

1) If Estonia had sunk today, it is possible that seismological instruments would have registered the vessel getting contact with the bottom. However, the instruments were not able to do so in 1994. Does the Armed Forces have sensor data from 1994 that is able to verify the time at which the vessel sank?

The Armed Forces has no such data because the Armed Forces' underwater sensor system did not at that time have a range that covered the accident site.

2) The joint international investigation committee (JAIC) report from 1997 contains an image (Figure 17.1, page 206) that indicates the position of various vessels in the area during the night. The positions of two unknown vessels have been given as just east of the accident site. Does the Armed Forces have information about which vessels these unknown vessels were?

Swedish gathering of data in order to compile a picture of the situation at sea is based on a large number of sources. At present, the most central sources are our own radar images and AIS (Automatic Identification System) information. In 1994, the Armed Forces did not have radar coverage of the accident site and the AIS system had not yet been introduced as a standard in the merchant shipping fleet. For this reason, the Armed Forces has no information about the two vessels that are mentioned in the JAIC report.

3) Does the Armed Forces have other information about vessel movements during the night of the accident close to the site where Estonia sank?

No, the Armed Forces is storing no such information today.

4) Does the Armed Forces have information about where the Swedish submarines were during the night of the accident?

Please refer to Memorandum Evidence concerning the activities of Swedish submarines during the sinking of M/S Estonia, appendix 1.

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5) A great deal of activity was instigated in the wake of the Estonia disaster. In addition to the accident investigation that was started, police investigation actions were also taken. It is reasonable to assume that MUST also took action. Does the Armed Forces possess any file or other documentation that concerns the sinking of Estonia. SHK would like to study such information.

There is no file or compiled information regarding M/S Estonia that is held by MUST or other parts of the Armed Forces.

6) It is known that the Armed Forces transported military materiel on Estonia on at least two occasions in September 1994. These operations were managed by KSI. Does the Armed Forces possess any file or other documentation that concerns these consignments. SHK would like to study such documentation.

There is no documentation held by the Armed Forces regarding these consignments. *Utredningen om transport av försvarsmateriel på M/S Estonia* (Fö 2004:06) reveals that the Armed Forces disclosed that two consignments of defence materiel were transported on 14 and 20 September 1994. The investigation also concludes that there was no reason to assume that the Armed Forces was looking to transport defence materiel on board M/S Estonia when the vessel sank. The Armed Forces has not found any documentation held by the authority that relates to the question.

7) Estonia began sailing the route in question on 1 February 1993. How many times did the Armed Forces transport military material on board Estonia?

The Armed Forces does not currently have any information about this other than that which is provided in the answer above. In dialogue with SHK, the Armed Forces has learned that the Armed Forces has transported some additional consignments on board Estonia; in total, this is said to have involved a handful of consignments. However, the Armed Forces does not hold any information about this.

8) What type of materiel was transported?

Utredningen om transport av försvarsmateriel på M/S Estonia reveals that it was electronic equipment with no link to weapons systems. The Armed Forces has no information about this materiel other than that which is described in the investigation.

9) Were any military vehicles being transported on Estonia?

No, the Armed Forces has no information about this other than that which is described in *Utredningen om transport av försvarsmateriel på M/S Estonia*.

10) How was the materiel transported?

In civilian vehicles.

11) Who was the recipient of the materiel?

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The Swedish Armed Forces.

12) Was any military materiel being transported on the night of the accident?

No, in accordance with that which is set out in *Utredningen om transport av försvarsmateriel på M/S Estonia*.

13) Does the Armed Forces have any information about other states that transported military materiel on Estonia?

No, the Armed Forces does not have any such information.

14) There was an agreement between the Armed Forces and Swedish Customs concerning a simplified clearance procedure when importing military materiel. SHK would like to study this agreement.

The Armed Forces' archives contain an agreement between the authority the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Swedish Customs (ÖB document designation USL H 904:7130). A copy of this agreement is appended to this response, see <u>appendix 2</u>.

Lieutenant Colonel Mikael Carleson, Lieutenant Colonel Johan Falkholt, Captain Fredrik Palmquist and armed forces lawyer Anna Saarikoski have participated in the preparation of this response.

This response has been decided on by acting C LEDS Colonel Magnus Magnusson. Colonel Anders Stach has served as rapporteur.

[signature] Magnus Magnusson Tjf C LEDS

[signature]
Anders Stach

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Security classification

Evidence concerning the activities of Swedish submarines during the sinking of M/S Estonia

Introduction and references

With the aim of illustrating the activities of Swedish submarines during the sinking of M/S Estonia on the night between 27 and 28 November 1994, the Naval Staff has conducted an investigation in accordance with the following.

- 1. Captain Fredrik Palmquist's *Memo concerning the positions of Swedish submarines on 28–29 September 1994* and previous studies of the archives,
- 2. renewed study of the archives by the Naval Staff in December 2022, ¹
- 3. inquiries in the Swedish Armed Forces (archive and employees), and
- 4. conversation with Chief of Operations of the Submarine Flotilla, Lieutenant Commander Daniel Petrak (Interviewee A).

In the previous memorandum, the positions of the submarines have mistakenly been given for 28 and 29 September 1994. Because the aim of the memorandum is to illustrate the positions/activities of the Swedish submarines on the night of the accident, the date given for the positions of the Swedish submarines should rightly be 27 and 28 September 1994. In addition, in the previous memorandum, HMS Hälsingland and HMS Östergötland have been mixed up in the table and do not match the information that appears in the description in the memorandum.

This new supporting documentation regarding the activities of Swedish submarines on 27 and 28 September 1994 has supplemented a previous summary containing, among other things, further reference material. Having examined deck logbooks and war diaries, information concerning the activities of HMS Hälsingland has also been corrected as set out below.

Summary of the results of the investigation

The supporting documentation reports the activities of the 12 existing Swedish submarines during 27 and 28 September 1994. The main method has been studies of archives at the Military Archives, supplemented with inquiries in the Swedish Armed Forces. In parallel with the study of archives, interviews have been conducted with personnel who served in submarine units at the time of the sinking of M/S Estonia, with the aim of both identifying operations of the submarines whose logbooks were missing and confirming the logbook notes for the remaining submarines.

Based on what emerges from the available logbooks and war diaries, the Naval Staff is able to conclude that it was not possible for a Swedish submarine to have been close to the area in which M/S Estonia sank on the night of the accident.

¹ Conducted by Commander Johan Guggenberger, Commander Daniel Petrak and Lieutenant Commander Erik Melin.

² Captain Fredrik Palmquist's *Memo concerning the positions of Swedish submarines on 28–29 - September 1994* and previous studies of the archives.

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To clarify the activities of the Swedish submarines, the deck logbooks have initially been examined. The deck logbooks indicate whether the vessel is moored or at sea, but not the position of the vessel. An engine room logbook is a register of operating machinery and systems for naval vessels and can show whether the vessel is under way or stationary. A war diary is the commander of the vessel's description of activities conducted.

In two cases it has not been possible to find logbooks for the period in question: HMS Neptun and HMS Södermanland. With regard to HMS Neptun, this is because HMS Neptun was laid up in a shipyard in Malmö between February 1993 and February 1995, which is why the vessel does not have logbooks for the night of the accident. When it comes to HMS Södermanland, the vessel was laid up from 7 March 1994 to 6 June 1995, which is why the vessel, like HMS Neptun, does not have logbooks for the night of the accident.

It happens that logbooks are missing from the National Archives as the handling of these had not, in some respects, a fixed procedure. The fact that logbooks have to be archived is clear, but it happens that they are not being sent to the archives. All logbooks and diaries have to be sent to the archives from the relevant unit or naval command.

Account concerning individual submarines

Submarines being overhauled and undergoing sea trials

HMS Neptun and HMS Södermanland

There are no deck and engine room logbooks for the period in question because HMS Neptun was laid up in a shipyard in Malmö from February 1993 to February 1995³ and HMS Södermanland was laid up from 7 March 1994 to 6 June 1995.⁴ The deck logbook for HMS Södermanland indicates that the vessel began being equipped following overhaul on 6 June 1995.⁵

The fact that both submarines were laid up on the night in question also emerges from conversations with personnel from the Submarine Flotilla. HMS Neptun was laid up because of a general overhaul in which she, among other things, was given a new stern as a result of a fire on board in 1992. On the night in question, HMS Södermanland was laid up for a general overhaul and was probably moored at Muskö.

HMS Sjölejonet and HMS Sjöhunden

Both of these submarines were undergoing a major modification (life extension) between 1992 and 1994 and were therefore undergoing sea trials. The deck logbook for

³ See the Swedish Armed Forces' list of archives.

⁴ See deck logbook for HMS Södermanland (Military Archives file no. 0571/S114:Ö/D1/12).

⁵ Military Archives file no. 0571/S114:Ö/D1/13.

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Sjölejonet⁶ indicates that Sjölejonet was moored at Karlskrona Naval Base during the night of the accident. The deck logbook for Sjöhunden⁷ indicates that the submarine was in dry dock during the night of the accident and that it was moved to a quay on the afternoon of 28 September 1994.

Submarines on standby/depot submarines

HMS Sjöbjörnen

The deck logbook⁸ indicates that Sjöbjörnen was moored at Karlskrona Naval Base during the night of the accident. Following conversations with personnel from the Submarine Flotilla, it emerges that the submarine was acting as a depot submarine.

HMS Sjöhästen

The deck logbook⁹ indicates that Sjöhästen was moored at Karlskrona Naval Base during the night of the accident. Following conversations with personnel from the Submarine Flotilla, it emerges that the submarine was acting as a depot submarine due to bad batteries.

HMS Östergötland

The deck logbook for HMS Östergötland (no. 63 from 01/09/1994 to 30/09/1994, inclusive)¹⁰ indicates that the submarine was moored at Berga Naval Base during the night of the accident. Following conversations with personnel from the Submarine Flotilla, it also appears that the submarine was only being used sporadically as a training platform due to battery problems (Interviewee A). There is no engine room logbook in the National Archives.

Fully operational submarines with crew

HMS Sjöormen

The deck logbook from HMS Sjöormen cannot be found in the Military Archives but the engine room logbook¹¹ and the war diary¹² confirm that the vessel was under way in Gotska sjön on the night of the accident. Supplementary information concerning the vessel's actions has been gathered from Interviewee A, who states the following. HMS Sjöormen was at sea in Gotska sjön on the night of the accident and was forced to discontinue snorkelling due to heavy seas. The news about the accident reached the submarine during the early hours of the morning, but the submarine continued to operate in Gotska sjön and mooring took place at Berga Naval Base one week after M/S Estonia sank.

⁶ Military Archives file no. 0571/S020:Ö/D1/23.

⁷ Military Archives file no. 0571/S017:Ö/D1/35.

⁸ Military Archives file no. 0571/S015:Ö/D1/27.

⁹ Military Archives file no. 0571/S017:Ö/D1/39.

¹⁰ Stored at the Swedish Armed Forces.

¹¹ Military Archives file no. 0573/S023:8/D2/12.

¹² Military Archives file no. 0573/S:015:H/D2/3.

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HMS Hälsingland

The deck logbook¹³ and war diary¹⁴ indicate that the vessel was moored at Karlskrona Naval Base on 28 September 1994. In light of what appears in the deck logbook and the war diary, the information that was provided in the previous memorandum can be corrected to that which is shown in the documentation above.

HMS Näcken

The deck logbook¹⁵ indicates that HMS Näcken was moored at Karlskrona Naval Base during the period in question. There is also an engine room logbook¹⁶ for HMS Näcken. Since the deck logbook shows that the vessel was moored, the engine room logbook for the period has not been examined.

HMS Najad

The deck logbook¹⁷ indicates that HMS Najad was moored at Karlskrona Naval Base during the period in question and cast off on 29 September 1994. There is also a war diary¹⁸ for the period for HMS Najad. Since the deck logbook shows that the vessel was moored, the war diary for the period in question has not been examined.

HMS Västergötland

The deck logbook¹⁹ indicates that HMS Västergötland was moored at Berga Naval Base during the period in question. There is also a war diary from 29 September 1994 for HMS Västergötland.²⁰ Since the deck logbook shows that the vessel was moored, and the war diary runs from the day after M/S Estonia sank, the war diary for the period in question has not been examined.

¹³ Military Archives file no. 0571/N071:Ö/D1/12.

¹⁴ Military Archives file no. 0571/N071:H/D1/1.

¹⁵ Military Archives file no. 0573/N016:Ö/D1/32.

¹⁶ Military Archives file no. 0573/N016:Ö/D2/19.

¹⁷ Military Archives file no. 0573/N017:Ö/D1/28.

¹⁸ Military Archives file no. 0573/N017:H/D1/6.

¹⁹ Military Archives file no. 0571N057:Ö/D1/13.

²⁰ Military Archives file no. 0571N057:H/D2/3.

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ⁱ Position and activity according to Interviewee A. ⁱⁱ The Swedish Armed Forces' archive register and Interviewee A. ⁱⁱⁱ According to the deck logbooks for HMS Södermanland (Military Archives file no. 0571/S114:Ö/D1/12 and Military Archives file no. 0571/S114:Ö/D1/13) and according to Interviewee A.

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Customs clearance of special materiel

The Swedish Armed Forces has a certain requirement to import special secret material. The secrecy can be attributable to Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Secrecy Act (1980:100), i.e. defence secrecy. This secrecy can also pertain to information about the countries from which the materiel is being imported in accordance with Chapter 2, Section 1 of the Secrecy Act, i.e. foreign secrecy.

For the purpose of creating an administrative procedure for these cases, Swedish Customs and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have agreed on the following:

The document is not subject to secrecy in accordance with a decision 2022-02-[text cut off] CFM2022-6133:1,

[signature] **LEDS JUR**

- Decisions concerning the acquisition of special secret material are made by 1. Commander Forces. of the Armed the Supreme
- Customs clearance of the material takes place at Arlanda or Bromma airport, 2. observing the appropriate secrecy.
- The administration of cases in accordance with point 1 takes place through 3. the supreme commander of the intelligence and security command and within customs by the customs administrators at Arlanda and Stockholm North.

[signature]

[signature]

Bengt Gustafsson

Ulf Larsson

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Director-General Swedish Customs

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