

This document is a translation of the original assessment in Swedish by SHK of the response to the recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the assessment.

The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority's report RS 2016:05

On 30 June 2016, the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) published the final report RS 2016:05 concerning the collision involving STENA JUTLANDICA and TERNVIND in Gothenburg's archipelago on 19 July 2015.

This report contained a total of eight recommendations, three of which were directed at Stena Line Scandinavia AB (hereafter Stena Line).

The recommendation to check that the VDRs on the shipping company's vessels save the data required by the regulations (RS 2016:05 R4) may be considered taken care of by the company.

With regard to the recommendation to review working schedules or in some other way compensate for the risks of fatigue that may arise in its operations (RS 2016:05 R5), the fact that the master is now woken at an earlier stage with the aim of reinforcing the crew on the bridge may be considered to be an adequate measure, provided that this does not have too great an impact on the master's opportunity to rest. It is also good that Stena Line says they will ensure that the crew receive sufficient rest following a watch period.

However, in terms of the scheduling itself, SHK would like to point out that there is no suggestion in the report that Stena Line's scheduling does not comply with the applicable legislation concerning working hours. Nevertheless, when it comes to the schedule in question, which was the second officer's summer schedule, SHK does conclude that this schedule still carries a high risk of fatigue while on duty, which may manifest in impairments to performance affecting attentiveness, planning and decision-making.

The analysis of the schedule results in values of between 7 and 8 on the KSS (Karolinska Sleepiness Scale) for the time of day at which the accident occurred. As stated in the report, values over 5 entail reduced alertness and a value over 8 means that there is a high risk of falling asleep. In this context, it is of less importance that the period on duty is followed by a recovery period of one or two weeks. SHK is of the opinion that Stena Line, guided by what is known from the research and by means of one of the scheduling tools researchers have developed, could improve its scheduling so that it is as good as possible for all bridge officers. However, Stena Line does not appear to have considered reviewing its schedules. This recommendation cannot therefore be considered to have been taken care of fully.

With regard to the final recommendation to consider revising on-board instructions with the intention of giving a higher priority to reporting to the JRCC (RS 2016:05 R6), Stena Line refers to existing procedures in its SMS system. However, the response does not indicate how these procedures relate to the check-list for collisions and the alarm in-

structions that the crew on STENA JUTLANDICA used in conjunction with the accident. Nor does it indicate whether Stena Line has considered revising these check-lists or whether it is instead the procedures in the SMS system that the company refers to that are to be used. It also does not indicate how contact with the JRCC is to be prioritised in relation to sounding the alarm with the shipping company's on-shore organisation and other actors. Given this, it is difficult to deem the recommendation as having been taken care of.

In summary, the recommendations may only be considered partly taken care of and the response may only be considered partly satisfactory.

Yours sincerely,

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