

SUMMARY

In the early morning of 19 July 2015, the tanker TERNVIND, loaded with oil products, departed Gothenburg on a voyage to Halmstad. Just before the pilotage line, the pilot left the vessel and the master, who was alone on the bridge with the helmsman, discovered that STENA JUTLANDICA was closing faster than he had anticipated. He then proposed that the vessels should pass starboard to starboard.

STENA JUTLANDICA, which was on its way in from Fredrikshavn, had already begun a slight turn to port ahead of TERNVIND in order to position herself in the fairway. As a result of a misunderstanding in the radio communications between the vessels, those in command of the vessels developed different understandings of how the meeting would be conducted. The master of TERNVIND got the impression that it had been agreed that they would pass starboard to starboard. However, on STENA JUTLANDICA, the officer intended to have the vessels to pass port to port. As TERNVIND was turning to port in order to, as the crew believed, provide more space for STENA JUTLANDICA, a collision occurred.

In summary, SHK is of the opinion that the accident was caused by improper planning of the vessels' meeting, combined with a misunderstanding in the communication concerning this meeting. Together, both vessels' respective turn to port also constituted a prerequisite for the collision to take place.

SHK is also of the opinion that inadequate lookout on TERNVIND and the pilotage ending too early probably constituted contributory causes of the accident. Another contributory cause may have been that the officers of the watch on the vessels probably were affected by fatigue.

In terms of raising the alarm, SHK concludes that internal reporting within Stena Line was prioritised ahead of reporting to the public rescue services. Nevertheless, the investigation has shown that in this respect the crew acted in accordance with the internal check-list for collisions that is in force within the shipping company. As an evacuation of a passenger vessel of STENA JUTLANDICA's size requires advance planning and preparation, SHK is of the opinion that there are grounds for Stena Line to revise the vessels' procedures, and those of the shipping company, with regard to what priority contact with the JRCC is to have.

With respect to the public rescue services, SHK is of the opinion that the JRCC should have classed the event as more serious than they did, and in the absence of an alarm from the vessel, should have taken the initiative to obtain more information about the event.

Safety recommendations

It is recommended that the Swedish Maritime Administration:

- Fully implement the measures that have been initiated in order to ensure that pilotage is conducted within the areas that are defined in applicable regulations and monitor that this is taking place (see Section 3.1). *(RS 2016:05 R1)*
- Take action to ensure, monitor and continuously follow up that the communication within the VTS areas is conducted in accordance with applicable regulations (see 3.2). *(RS 2016:05 R2)*
- Implement measures in order to ensure that operations in the JRCC are undertaken in accordance with applicable instructions and monitor that the clarifications that have been made in these instructions have the intended effect (see 3.7). *(RS 2016:05 R3)*

It is recommended that Stena Line Scandinavia AB:

- Check that VDRs on the shipping company's vessels save the data required by the regulations (see Section 3.3.3). *(RS 2016:05 R4)*
- Review working schedules or in some other way compensate for the risks of fatigue that may arise in its operations (see 3.3.4). *(RS 2016:05 R5)*
- Consider revising on-board instructions with the intention of giving a higher priority to reporting to the JRCC (see 3.6). *(RS 2016:05 R6)*

It is recommended that Terntank Ship Management AB:

- Ensure that lookout is kept on board its vessels in accordance with the applicable regulations (see 3.3.1). *(RS 2016:05 R7)*
- Check that VDRs on the shipping company's vessels save the data required by the regulations (see 3.3.3). *(RS 2016:05 R8)*