

## SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

The RIB boat T7 departed from Strandvägen in Stockholm in order to take passengers to the island Grinda in Stockholm archipelago. Outside Blockhusudden the speed was increased and shortly afterwards, the RIB boat met another, bigger, passenger boat. The master's intention was to face the waves a bit obliquely, not at 90° angle, and to slow down the speed slightly. The RIB boat met the first wave well, in the second wave a "snatch" (bump laterally) came. The landing was a little skewed, and for the persons on board there was a jerk both horizontally and vertically. The crew has estimated the speed to about 35 knots when they met the first wave and the free fall at the forward part of the boat to about two meters when they met the second wave.

One passenger was injured in the back when the RIB boat landed. Another passenger signaled to the crew to stop, which was immediately done. After that, they went into a wharf at Nacka Strand with low speed and called at the same time after the ambulance. Well at the wharf, the marine police (which were berthed at the wharf) assisted the crew, waiting for the ambulance. One of the passengers followed the injured person to the hospital in the ambulance. The injured passenger suffered, according to medical reports from Sweden and United Kingdom, *"a wedged-shaped stable fracture Th 6 on a lumbar vertebra in the back"*.

The accident was caused by the excessive speed of 35 knots in combination with a turn when the boat met the waves. Contributing causes were the shortcomings in planning the journey's initial part at high speed including the omitted "heating up" of the passengers.

In addition to the factors directly affecting the accident that occurred, the investigation also highlights some other issues relating to RIB charter operations. These include supervision issues, education and competencies, and general routines regarding RIB boats. The report also states that there is a need to expand the reporting obligation in case of marine casualties and incidents.

## Safety recommendations

### The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

- Perform risk based supervision of existing RIB shipowners in Sweden as soon as possible and prepare a plan for a realistic inspection interval for RIB boats (see sections 2.4 and 2.6) (*RS 2018:03 R1*).
- In their supervision of the course holders, evaluate the course content of the HSF education (handling high speed crafts) e.g. the navigation methodology and consider appropriate measures to maintain the skills acquired in the HSF course and appropriately handle the requirement for Engineer Officer class VIII for boats with two outboard motors (see section 2.4) (*RS 2018:03 R2*).
- Cooperate with the branch organization for this type of operations with the aim of jointly developing safety standards (see section 2.5) (*RS 2018:03 R3*).

**The shipping company Öppet hav AB is recommended to:**

- Introduce routines which imply that relevant safety information is provided upon booking to the person who book the trip. The information should also include that passengers in advance are informed of the contents of the trip and that it is inappropriate to arrange so-called surprise trips with RIB boats if the purchaser does not know the participants health status (see section: 2.1) *(RS 2018:03 R4)*.
- Implement checklists or other standardized information material to support the crews' instructions on safety routines and pre-departure introduction to the passengers (see section: 2.1) *(RS 2018:03 R5)*.

**The Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation is recommended to:**

- Consider extending the obligation to report marine accidents and incidents to those authorities who normally are involved in rescue operations at sea (see section 2.4) *(RS 2018:03 R6)*.