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Swedish Accident Investigation Authority P.O. Box 12538 SE-102 26

This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

Supplementary response to the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority's (SHK's) assessment of the Swedish Transport Agency's response to a recommendation

(SHK report RL 2015:11 R2)

In SHK report RL 2015:11, the Swedish Transport Agency was recommended to:

"Develop supervisory methods so that EASA Part M, Subpart G approval holders ensure that Aircraft Maintenance Programmes (AMP) are based on the latest data from the type certificate holders (RL 2015:11 R2)."

Supervision methods

The Swedish Transport Agency's current method of supervision has shown that aircraft maintenance programmes (AMPs) are an area that gives rise to a large number of deficiencies during operational inspections. This has been identified in conjunction with the analysis of the results of supervision conducted by the Transport Agency.

It was decided in the Transport Agency's analytical activities for CAMOs and aircraft, 16/04/2015, that the area AMPs would be investigated in order to determine what the deficiencies consist of. The summary was reported on 25/08/2015 and at that time it was also decided that a remedial programme will be drawn up.

Information was provided about common deficiencies in AMPs, including the degree of detail, during the Transport Agency's seminars in October 2015 (the 15th and 28th). The Transport Agency has also provided information about the importance of those who are carrying out the ordered maintenance reporting to the CAMO when the maintenance procedure cannot be performed, which is something that did not happen during the maintenance on the helicopter in question.



Date 18/12/2015 2 (2)

As a consequence of this, the focus of the future efforts to improve AMPs should be on creating greater knowledge and understanding of the areas that need to be particularly carefully observed when drawing up AMPs and on the maintenance organisation reporting to the CAMO if there are any maintenance duties that cannot be performed.

Because this area has already been identified, the Transport Agency does not believe there is a need to amend the supervision methodology.

Yours respectfully,

[Signature]

Simon Posluk

Chair – Aviation Accident Analysis Board