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This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

Swedish Accident Investigation Authority
P.O. Box 6014
SE-102 31 Stockholm

The Swedish Transport Agency's opinion concerning the final report into the serious incident at Gothenburg/Säve Airport, Västra Götaland County on 22 July 2020 involving a Piper PA-28 with registration SE-KIU, operated by a private individual

Safety recommendations

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

- Analyse and, if necessary, take measures to ensure flight safety-related runway information shall be available in the AIP also for other non-instrument airports in AIP Sweden. *(RL 2021:02 R1)*

The Transport Agency has studied the aforementioned draft final report and intends to:

- During the upcoming inspection of Gothenburg / Säve Airport, pay specific attention to the occurrence in question within the scope of the airport's management system in respect of that which occurred with a root cause analysis, concrete actions taken and follow-up in order to minimise the risk of landing before the published runway, i.e. before the threshold.
- Conduct an analysis of airports published in AIP section AD2 that are non-instrument airports and that conduct VFR traffic with the aid of an air traffic control service, if there is a need of chart information that shall be published. Furthermore, consideration is being given to whether there are differences in the physical design of runway lengths that may have an impact on the misjudgement of the placement of the actual threshold.

The Transport Agency has taken the following action:

- Analysis has been conducted on the airports in question in respect of the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority's recommendations.

Two airports (Karlsborg/Vidsel) are exclusively military, have an air traffic control service and retrieval of PPR is obtained in accordance with a specific procedure. The results of the analysis show that the actual runway lengths at each airport correspond to the information published in AIP and a misjudgement of the actual threshold is not deemed to exist. Current chart information and runway status can be obtained through a specific procedure. No further action by the Transport Agency.

One airport (Gothenburg / Säve) has civil VFR traffic, an air traffic control service and requires PPR. The results of the analysis show that the actual runway length corresponds to the information published in AIP and it is possible to misjudge the real threshold as the airport has chosen to use a shorter section of the entire length of the physical runway.

The airport has provided clarification with an image of the runway marked with a cross and text information on the website, as well as an additional clarifying text in AIP AD2 subsequent to the occurrence. Chart information is found in the publications in which VFR information is made available to pilots who fly VFR e.g. *Svenska flygfält* and *Skydemon*.

The Transport Agency does not see a need for the airport operator to publish a chart in AIP/AD2 as the primary purpose of AD2 is to provide current relevant information to instrument aerodromes and aircraft operators who are flying in accordance with IFR.

Decisions in this case have been made by Andreas Tapani, head of section. The adviser Magnus Axelsson from the section for helicopters, general aviation and pleasure boats, Niclas Bergling from the section for airspace and aerodromes, the expert in human factors/MTO Nicklas Svensson and the accident coordinator Magnus Hällborn have participated in the final administration of the case, the latter acting as rapporteur.

Andreas Tapani

Head
Section for analysis