**SUMMARY**

ASKÖ had loaded pellets in Ust-Luga, Russia, for transport to Hässelby in Sweden. The vessel had ordered a pilot from Landsort to Hässelby and the pilot boarded at Landsort on 8 December at 22:30.

The vessel passed Nockeby Bridge at 04:31, at which point the pilot announced that they had approximately half an hour remaining to Hässelby. The master came up onto the bridge at the same time. After Nockeby Bridge, the pilot set the course to 309° on the autopilot and in doing so steered straight toward the red buoy at Hässelby holme. The pilot began reducing speed when ASKÖ had approximately 1 M[1] remaining to Hässelby holme and simultaneously switched over to manual steering.

When ASKÖ was to pass the sound between the mainland and Hässelby holme, the pilot discovered that the vessel was on the wrong side of the buoy. He stopped the engine, but was not able to turn before the vessel ran aground. The time was then around 04.50. When it ran aground, the vessel also hit a water pipe from Lovö Waterworks that crossed the fairway under the water.

The accident resulted in extensive damage to the vessel's hull and to the aforementioned water pipe and its supporting structure.

The cause of the accident was shortcomings in the monitoring of the navigation.

Other factors that have contributed to the occurrence:

- The lack of satisfactory bridge cooperation between the pilot and the crew.
- No voyage plan had been made by the vessel's crew for the final part of the voyage.
- The vessel lacked charts for the final part of the voyage.

Against a background of a built-up sleep deficit, the time of day, the long pilotage and the lack of opportunities for rest and recovery, it is also probable that the pilot's level of alertness has been adversely affected by fatigue at the time of the grounding. This has led to insufficient vigilance, which in turn may have contributed to the fact that the pilot did not discover in time that the vessel was on the wrong side of the buoy.

One important underlying factor is the pilots' irregular working hours and rest periods, which make it difficult to plan for rest and thus also to obtain proper periods of continuous sleep.

[1] M – nautical mile. 1 M = 1,852 metres.

**Safety recommendations**

**The Swedish Maritime Administration is recommended to:**

- Review its methods for scheduling in order to, if possible, shorten the pilotages that exceed 3–4 hours. (See section 3.3.3) *(RS 2017:05 R1)*

- Investigate how it may be possible to increase the regularity of pilots' rest periods while on duty. (See section 3.3.2)
  *(RS 2017:05 R2)*

- Develop guidelines or other assessment support for the decision of the pilots to refuse pilotage in case a vessel is not deemed to be seaworthy. (See section 3.3.1) *(RS 2017:05 R3)*