



ICAO, ref. AN 6/26-AIG71879

FAA, ref. 17.113

EASA, ref. SWED-2016-001

Transport Canada, ref. AARQ 5002-A16F0007

RDIMS 12768408

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SHK assessment of responses to safety recommendations RL 2016:11 R1, R2, R4 and R6

On 12 December 2016 the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (Statens haverikommission – SHK) published a report, RL 2016:11, concerning an accident with the aircraft SE-DUX the 8 January 2016 at Oajevágge, Norrbotten County.

In the report SHK issued a safety recommendation that called the recipients to ensure that a general system of initial standard calls for the handling of abnormal and emergency procedures and also for unusual and unexpected situations is implemented throughout the commercial air transport industry. Identical safety recommendations with this content were issued to ICAO, FAA, Transport Canada and EASA.

ICAO has responded that they consider that the safety recommendation addresses issues concerning flight crew coordination and training and that this is a responsibility for States and operators.

FAA has reviewed the Advanced Qualification Program, which is a data-driven training system, and the requirements concerning training of Crew Resource Management. Furthermore, FAA has sampled data from several operators looking for negative trends in their Safety Assurance System. FAA refers to a number of published guidance that address Standard Operating Procedures. FAA has sampled operator's Quick Reference Handbooks to evaluate the potential need to develop the Standard Operating Procedures to address the general handling of abnormal and emergency procedures. Since 12 March 2019, there are new requirements concerning Extended Envelope Training and Stall and Upset Recovery.


Transport Canada has responded to the safety recommendation in short and foreseen a future formal response in substance. Such a response has not been sent to SHK. In an informal e-mail, Transport Canada has stated that they have been in contact with Bombardier as well as with FAA and EASA to discuss the recommendation.

EASA has responded to the recommendation and claims that the existing regulatory framework already provides requirements for monitoring and intervention on

abnormal and emergency procedures with a special emphasis on unexpected situations. EASA intends to support air operators in its implementation. For this purpose, EASA has published a Safety Promotion document on Crew Resource Management training implementation.

SHK recalls that the safety recommendation was issued against the background that when the aircraft behaved in an unexpected way and the crew tried to address the situation they began to communicate operatively with each other after 15 seconds. After another two seconds the maximum allowable speed was exceeded. SHK considered in the report that a system of initial standard calls for clear, precise and bidirectional communication between the pilots could have contributed to solve the situation and possibly avoid the accident. SHK is aware that such systems are already in place within some aircraft manufacturers' manuals and some operators. However, it is a deficiency that this is not a standard throughout the commercial air transport industry.

Notwithstanding that SHK had expected the recipients to take firmer measures, SHK considers that the responses assessed together are adequate and that there has been measures taken with the purpose to address the recommendation.
(Closed – adequate response).



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