

Date
01/09/2022File
TSJ 2021-1035Your date
02/06/2022Your designation
J-05/21

This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

Party:

Swedish Accident Investigation Authority

Box 6014

102 31 Stockholm

Response to recommendation in SHK final report RJ 2022:02, derailment involving Green Cargo's freight train 9400 on 11 February 2021 on the section of track between Kummelby and Häggvik

Decision of the Swedish Transport Agency

The Swedish Transport Agency has received the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority's (SHK) final report RJ 2022:02 into a derailment involving Green Cargo's freight train 9400 on the section of track between Kummelby and Häggvik on 11 February 2021.

In the report, SHK directs the following safety recommendation at the Swedish Transport Agency:

- Within the scope of its supervision, follow up the action taken by the Swedish Transport Administration as a result of recommendation RJ 2022:02 R1 and RJ 2022:02 R2. (*RJ 2022:02 R3*)

Swedish Transport AgencyRoad and railway
Box 267, 781 23 Borlänge
Visitors' address
Jussi Björlings väg 19, Borlänge

Telephone +46 771-503 503

Fax +46 243-152 74

transportstyrelsen.se
jarnvag@transportstyrelsen.se**Katarina Bjurman**Rail transport Rail
transport regulations
katarina.bjurman@transportstyrelsen.se
+46 104-955 247

Safety recommendations directed at the Swedish Transport Administration:

- Continue the development work it is doing to enable crack formation in rail to be identified at an earlier stage.
(*RJ 2022:02 R1*)
- From a comprehensive perspective, review how current systems for preventing surface fatigue leading to broken rails can be improved. This review should include evaluating the intervals applied for non-destructive testing, follow-up of how defects are located, reported and marked out in practice and an analysis of the potential consequences of departing from the set interval for preventive machining. (*RJ 2022:02 R2*)

The Swedish Transport Agency's response to the SHK recommendations is provided below:

Regarding recommendation RJ 2022:02 R3

The Swedish Transport Agency shall, in its supervision, monitor that organisations are operating in accordance with applicable requirements and that they are addressing the risks their activities entail. Our supervision shall be directed at those activities where there is the greatest risk and where supervision has the greatest impact. Where possible we conduct systemic supervision in which we focus on the operators' systematic working practices and assess the organisation's safety culture.

As a rule, there are major differences between operators who are active in a certain supervision area, for example which activities are conducted or the size of the organisation. These differences mean that operators have a varied impact on the transport policy goals, which in turn means that the Transport Agency's work needs to focus on those operators and those areas that constitute the greatest risk at any particular time.

The Transport Agency's risk model for supervision of rail traffic forms the basis of operational planning that identifies which priority operators will be subject to supervision in the year ahead, broken down into quarters. Prioritisation takes place on the basis of factors including the availability of resources, supervision proposals and past occurrences. At the same time, specific supervisory directions are identified for the year ahead on the basis of the strategy, the annual safety report, intelligence-gathering, recommendations from SHK etc.

As part of the supervision, infrastructure managers are inspected in order to ensure, among other things, that the organisation is able to manage safety risks linked to physical assets throughout their entire life cycle. Inspections are also conducted to check that the organisation has procedures that ensure the assets are being used for their intended purpose and are kept in a safe and operational condition, and at the expected performance level.

Ahead of the annual corporate meeting (supervision) with the Transport Administration, the Transport Agency has announced that we would like to find out, at this meeting, how the Transport Administration is, as a consequence of the broken rail and resulting derailment in Häggvik and on the Malmbanan (Iron Ore Line), working to identify and rectify defects in the track infrastructure. The recommendations SHK has directed at the Transport Administration will be a starting point for this dialogue.

At the start of autumn, our annual operation planning process is also being conducted. SHK's recommendations will be included in this as a basis on which to select supervisory actions that will take place during the next financial year.

Decisions in this case have been made by Petra Wernström, Departmental Director. Maria Jäderholm, head of section, Petra Särefjord, head of section, Katarina Bjurman, investigator, participated in the final administration of the case, the latter acting as rapporteur.

Petra Wernström
Departmental Director, Road and Railway