

SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

With two passengers on board, the taxi boat Sunni departed to cross Furusund channel between the mainland and the island Marö. The two passengers, a man and a woman, did not wear any life jacket and the boat started the journey with the door, top hatch and windows closed.

At this time there was very dense fog in Södersundet and the northern part of the fairway. The fog made it difficult to see more than a very short distance.

During the journey the master had to rely on navigating by using electronic means, a newly purchased navigation system with radar and chart plotter. The master showed the passengers an echo just in front of them. The echo was very small on the screen but the master explained that it was another boat that was in the area and that they would pass close to each other. They could due to the reduced visibility not see the other boat. The passage was then with short distance on Sunni's port side, and only then they could actually see the boat. Any other echo, which could be a hazard, they didn't see.

Meanwhile, the VIKING GRACE was en route from Stockholm. When the ship had passed Furusund visibility had been good, but when they approached Marö visibility tended to deteriorate. According to the crew, they could only seconds before the collision occurred see a boat, which proved to be the taxi boat Sunni, coming from the port side, crossing their head-line.

VIKING GRACE hit Sunni with the bow around the middle of the Sunni's starboard side and Sunni was pressed down into the water and pushed along with VIKING GRACE and then came over on the larger vessel's starboard side. Neither the master of the Sunni nor the crew of the VIKING GRACE took any evasive action to avoid the collision.

Witnesses on an island nearby were able to rescue the three, who had ended up in the water with no flotation devices.

The accident was caused by both ships traveling on crossing courses in the fairway in the belief that there was no risk of collision. This could happen since the crews of both ships failed to discover the other vessel.

The reason that none of the crews had discovered that the other ship was nearby has not been defined. However, the task to note and interpret the information on the radar screens good enough was not completed on any of the ships.

The absence of sound signaling from both ships contributed to the collision not being avoided.

Recommendations

Given that Viking Line after the occurrence has taken measures including awareness of the importance of signaling and the role and resource the lookout involves, the Investigation Commission does not find any reason to issue any recommendations to Viking Line.

Likewise, the Investigation Commission finds no reason to make recommendations to Gräskö Marine AB since the company has taken measures including sound signaling and lookout.

However, the Investigation Commission finds reason to issue the following recommendations.

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

- consider imposing requirements on radar training for masters with exam *Skepparexamen* for duties on vessels in commercial traffic. (RS 2015:02 R1)
- consider imposing requirements on AIS on board vessel of any size used in commercial traffic. (RS 2015:02 R2)