

SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

A failure in operation on FINNTRADER resulted in a close blackout when departing Travemünde on March 11, 2014. This was only one of many operational failures that had occurred during some time. They were all in some way associated to the vessel's new engine control system and had, according to the master, to be rectified before the vessel could continue in service.

It has been clear on an early stage in the investigation that the primary cause of most of the incidents in question has been a poor installation of the new engine control system. This has, in turn, led to a repeated number of failures in operation of comparatively serious character. Further, the investigation has shown that the vessel has been in operation for a longer period with these deficiencies. This has led the investigation to focus on organizational matters rather than technical issues.

The direct cause of the failure on March 11, 2014 was a switch being inadequately mounted, which led to an incorrect signal making the system to act improperly.

The other occurrences dealt with in the report are in one way or another associated to the poor installation of the new engine control system or to deficiencies in the control system itself.

The investigation finds that the vessel was allowed to be in operation with an engine control system that was neither finally tested nor approved by the classification society. The system was even so defective that it was considered not to be ready for final tests. In spite of this, the society did not issue any Condition of Class for compensation. According to the investigation, a strongly contributing cause of the occurrences is the fact that the vessel was allowed to stay in service by the company as well as the classification society and the inspectorate authority, with a deficient, non-approved engine control system. It took, amongst other things, long time for the company to take proper action and the inspectorate authority has not used the stronger means available. A reason for this has been that the involved parties either has believed that the problems would be solved eventually or that the problems after each improvement had been solved. Other contributing factors may have been lack of use of adequate competence by the classification society and an unclear division of responsibilities and different views regarding the formal procedures for exchanging information between the society and the inspectorate authority.

Safety recommendations

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

- within its maritime inspection activities, when inspecting as well as when surveying after an accident or incident, act in order to have occurrences reported according to legislation (*RS 2016:03 R1*).
- within the maritime industry increase knowledge about safety culture and what is associated with it, and within the maritime inspectorate activities act to increase safety culture on vessels (*RS 2016:03 R2*).
- within its organization clarify responsibilities, obligations for reporting, and ways of communication between the agency and classification societies (*RS 2016:03 R3*).
- ensure that the agency uses the authorities and means to its disposal to maintain safety at sea. (*RS 2016:03 R4*).

Finnlines Ship Management AB is recommended to:

- see to that routines for reporting accidents and incidents are improved and in accordance with the legislation in force (*RS 2016:03 R5*).

DNV GL is recommended to:

- in its maritime surveillance activities act so accidents and incidents on vessels are reported to flag inspectorate according to existent legislation (*RS 2016:03 R6*).
- consider to establish routines for how long or under what circumstances a Condition of Class may be prolonged (*RS 2016:03 R7*).
- review its routines for ensuring that relevant competency is used for approvals and inspections (*RS 2016:03 R8*).
- within its organization clarify the responsibilities and ways of communication between the society and the flag inspectorate, and clarify the routines for reporting to the flag inspectorate (*RS 2016:03 R9*).