

Swedish Accident Investigation Authority  
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This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

## Collision at Helsingborg operations site on 7 February 2019

On 22 January 2020, the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority has asked the Swedish Transport Administration to provide information about what action will be taken as a result of the recommendations issued in the final report RJ 2020:01, Collision between a shunting movement and a passenger train at Helsingborg operations site, Skåne County on 7 February 2019. In this report, four recommendations were directed at the Transport Administration and an account of the action that will be taken is provided below.

### *RJ 2020:01 R2:*

- *perform a review of the regulation regarding railway traffic (TTJ) with the purpose of in a more clear way regulating how information shall be exchanged between e.g. a signaller and a shunter (see section 3.2).*

The Transport Administration will investigate the feasibility of regulating more clearly how and what information shall be exchanged between signallers and shunters. Complete: 30/06/2021

### *RJ 2020:01 R3:*

- *investigate if shunting operations in situations such as in this one, i.e. when shunting movements can come in conflict with passenger trains, actually are carried out in a sufficiently safe manner and, if it is motivated from a safety standpoint, suggest appropriate measures (see section 3.5.2).*

The Transport Administration will investigate the feasibility of allowing shunting movements to drive on a locked route and, where possible, with the train protection system activated. Complete: 30/06/2021

### *RJ 2020:01 R4:*

- *perform a review of both the paper and computer-based version of the checklist for accident, incident and discrepancy so that both versions can provide a uniform and equally clear support, regardless of which version that is used (see section 3.6.3).*

The Transport Administration will review and revise the instruction manual "Dealing with alarms in the event of accidents, incidents and non-conformities on railways" TDOK 2014:0089, ver. 8.0 (paper version) and BOTA (digital version) so that they are consistent with one another. Complete: 31/12/2020



**RJ 2020:01 R5:**

• *in an appropriate way strengthen the local signallers' preparedness and capability to handle serious and rare emergency events, e.g. by conducting additional training sessions, improving technical support systems or clarifying what support a signaller can rely on from other available personnel (see section 3.6.4).*

The Transport administration's project "Develop local train clearance" will review what improvements can be made to the handling of serious and rare emergency events in line with SHK's recommendation. Complete:

31/12/2020

**Additional information**

Over the course of 2019, the national SPAD (signal passed at danger) group has conducted an investigation that resulted in the report "The lone dwarf signal - a summary of problems, risks and proposed solutions". The proposed solutions identified involved:

- Training in shunting (theoretical and practical, including simulator)
- Safety discussions
- Raising the awareness value of dwarf signals
- Consistent use of permission dwarf signals
- Change of technical norms
- Process for enabling the rectification of individual dwarf signals
- Route shunting (action already decided, see RJ 2020:01 R3 above).
- Work train instead of shunting
- Technical changes to interlocking
- ERTMS

Measures for implementation are now being developed on the basis of these proposals. These are subsequently being adopted in an action plan called "The lone dwarf, ver. 1.0".

Best regards,

Anders Landén  
Director of Safety