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TRV 2016/90945	01/12/2017
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J-40/16	1(2)

Swedish Accidents Investigation Authority  
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This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

## **Collision between blocked line train with assisting vehicle and stationary train on the section Kil – Molkom, Värmland County, on 30 September 2016, RJ 2017:04**

The Swedish Transport Administration has received your final report on the incident. The report recommends that the Transport Administration:

*“Consider whether the upper speed limit for “full visibility speed” is to be one of the parameters included when the maximum permitted speed for a blocked train with assisting vehicle on system M shall be established and entered in the train protection system before blocked line operation commences. (RJ 2017:04 R1)”.*

During the autumn, the Transport Administration has considered the recommendation. This has been done through work with the relevant regulatory experts in and outside the Transport Administration, which has resulted in measures being taken.

The work has also concluded that the speed of 40 km/h is to be viewed as an upper speed limit and not as “full visibility speed”.

This means that if the upper speed limit is entered, it could give the false impression of a “speed recommendation” and thereby entail that the operator does not take into account the parameters required to operate the vehicle at “full visibility speed”.

“Full visibility speed” means that the operator must adapt the speed to the prevailing conditions, i.e., based on weather and wind, distance of the line visibility, the vehicle’s braking capacity, information in the line manual, etc.

### **The Transport Administration’s measures (2)**

The Transport Administration has decided to investigate if it is possible to adapt the requirements in TTJ to the requirements set out in TSD Operation and Traffic Management, in terms of information on the location of the train in need of assistance. The adaptation is scheduled to be completed by 1 June 2020.

The measure is based on the fact that the requirements set out in TTJ and TSD Operation and Traffic Management respectively are in direct conflict with each other.

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## SWEDISH TRANSPORT ADMINISTRATION

TSD Operation and Traffic Management states that when the assisting train stands ready on the section of track where the train in need of assistance is located, the dispatcher is at least to inform the operator of the assisting vehicle of:

- the position of the train in need of assistance
- the location where the train in need of assistance is to be taken.

Sweden (TTJ) is of the opinion that it is safest if the operator of the assisting vehicle does not know the exact position, while TSD Operation and Traffic Management indicates that it is important for the operator of the assisting vehicle to know the position.

The Transport Administration has decided to investigate if it is possible to regulate the contact between operators so that it takes place in a manner which ensures traffic safety, as the current prohibition does not function as an impediment. The measure is scheduled to be completed by 1 June 2020.

The measure is based on the fact that TTJ currently does not allow contact between the operator of the train in need of assistance and the operator of the assisting train. The Transport Administration is aware that contact between operators occurs today with the help of modern technology. Your investigation also reveals that the operators have had communication with each other regarding location, despite this being prohibited under TTJ.

Sincerely,  
[signature]  
Anders Landén  
Director of Safety and Security