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This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

Collision between trains on the stretch Piteå-Arnamark on 21 September 2016

On 6 September 2017, SHK published report RJ 2017:03 on the above event.

In the report, SHK issues two recommendations to the Swedish Transport Administration. Based on these, the Swedish Transport Administration has taken the following measures:

The first recommendation:

- With regard to the controls that a traffic controller is obliged to perform when allowing a train to pass a signal at “danger”, analyze if the conditions for safe operations are fully met when allowing the traffic controller to choose the control method and to use only one method. (**RJ 2917:03, R1**)

Today’s regulatory framework states that: The rail traffic controller must check the actual position of the trains that could potentially be located on the monitored stretch via one of the following methods:

- discussing with the drivers
- checking that logical movements are made
- verifying the train’s position by checking the organisation’s rail traffic controller documentation with regard to train movements

At present, rail traffic controllers can choose one of the above methods of checking where the trains are.

A proposal has been developed in order to change the regulatory framework. It entails that the rail traffic controller must first contact the driver and combine this with checking the driver’s information against the signal box indications and rail traffic controller documentation, in accordance with the following.

“The rail traffic controller shall check the actual positions of the trains that could potentially be located on the monitored stretch by communicating with the drivers and checking the drivers’ information against the actual signal box indications and the rail traffic controller documentation. If a driver cannot be reached and the train is expected to have reached its final destination, the rail traffic controller must make sure of this by making contact with the railway company concerned.”

The second recommendation:

- Review if there is need for clarification, or additional educational efforts, regarding how the traffic controller shall review their documentation, what the review should include and which status and relation to each other the different paper forms and electronic systems have. (**RJ 2017:03, R2**).

In 2017, further training has been provided to rail traffic controller instructors and supervisors. The content of this training includes the status of the documentation, forms and electronic systems in relation to one another. For educational purposes, the event will be included in the central training for all operative personnel in 2018.

Kind regards,

[Signature]

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By direction

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