

SUMMARY

The intention was to carry out a private flight with an acquaintance over Gotland.

After the landing, the pilot let the aircraft roll out with the intention of leaving the runway at runway end 03 to taxi back to Gotland's Flying Club via the taxiway system. Approximately 40 seconds after the landing, the pilot received clearance from the tower to turn around on the runway. He stopped temporarily at runway 10/28 and then taxied all the way to Gotland's Flying Club.

Just before parking, the pilot and the passenger got the first indication that there was a problem when they smelled a faint smoke odour. At parking, the pilot saw smoke and then flames that broke out in front of the wing. The pilot ordered the passenger to evacuate.

The pilot fought the fire at the left landing gear leg using a fire extinguisher. The municipality's fire and rescue service arrived at the accident site and extinguished the fire.

At the examination of the aircraft no technical faults were found that could have caused the fire. However, there were traces of an oil stain in the hangar at the place where the caliper was positioned when parking.

During the investigation, it has emerged that the brake hose that was installed has not been included in the maintenance program and that the hose probably exceeded its calendar time by a large margin.

SHK:s reference taxiing showed that with normal braking or with a light application of the brakes it was relatively easy to reach a temperature on the brake disc that could ignite the hydraulic oil.

SHK conclude that the probable cause of the fire is that atomized oil has sprayed onto the heated brake disc and ignited. The fire has after that spread to tires, wheel covers and other combustible materials around the landing gear.

The accident was probably caused by the condition of the brake hose causing an oil leak, which in combination with a hot brake disc caused the fire.

The fact that the hose's calendar time was not considered when establishing the new maintenance program can be seen as a shortcoming in the routines of the airworthiness organisation. This has resulted in that the maintenance tasks prescribed by the type certificate holder has not been evaluated by the airworthiness organisation.

Safety recommendations

None.