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Rachel Daeschler
Deputy Strategy & Safety Management Director
and Head of Safety Intelligence & Performance
Department

2017(D)52719
MCOL/RBE/SM.1
Cologne,

02. JUNI 2017

Board of Accident Investigation
(Statens Haverikommission / SHK)

Mr Hans Ytterberg

Director General
P.O. Box 12538
10229 Stockholm
Sweden

Subject: Safety recommendation related to the event to DIAMOND - DA42 registered SE-LVR,
on 22/01/2016, at Ängsö - Västmanland County - Sweden

Dear Mr Ytterberg,

Following the Safety Recommendation mentioned above addressed to the European Aviation Safety Agency, please find thereafter the Agency's response.

Yours sincerely,



Rachel Daeschler

Copy: Aircrew & Medical
Certification Director
Flight Standards Director
Strategy & Safety Management Director

Subject: DIAMOND - DA42 registered SE-LVR, on 22/01/2016, at Ängsö - Västmanland County - Sweden

Reply to Safety Recommendation SWED-2017-001 received on 21/03/2017

Safety Recommendation:	Identify exercises in flight training that might entail an increased risk factor and to issue guidance material (GM) for the practical execution of these. (RL 2017:04 R1).
Response:	<p>EASA made a comprehensive review of all accidents and serious incidents since the year 2000 related to flight instruction or examination on aircrafts with a maximum take-off weight below 5.7t. This review highlighted the higher risk related to stall and upset training exercises as well as the in-flight simulation of an engine-out situation.</p> <p>EASA used the opportunity of the aircrew standardisation meeting with the competent authorities that took place on 12.10.2016 to present a similar accident investigation as a case study. The EASA review was shared with competent authorities of EASA Member States to support them in the frame of their oversight responsibilities.</p> <p>However, the Agency believes that there is not a one-size-fits-all guidance material because the risk areas vary depending on the type of activity. The risk has to be permanently evaluated and monitored in line with latest information. Each organisation has to define their own procedures tailored to mitigate the risks associated with their specific fleet and operations. The Agency does not offer the proper level of granularity and cannot substitute for the requirement for an Approved Training organisation (ATO) to implement a hazard identification and risk mitigation process (ORA.GEN.200 Management System of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1178/2011).</p> <p>Therefore, whilst it is acknowledged that prescriptive limitations without safety assurance have limited effect, awareness and safety promotion are key vectors to help ATOs in their Safety Risk Management.</p> <p>The Swedish Safety Investigation Authority has already issued a similar recommendation and expressed a doubt on the effectiveness of individual flight schools' safety management systems (SMS). Because SMS is an essential component of organisations approval and is under the scrutiny of the oversight function, EASA will send a new information to all Member States to carefully take into consideration the increased risk of such exercise in the frame of their oversight function and clarify the status of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training.</p>

	In addition, the Agency will contact the Swedish Transport Agency and work in cooperation with it with the objective that individual flight schools properly follow SMS principles and demonstrate it to their Competent Authority.
Status:	Open

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