

SUMMARY IN ENGLISH

On Sunday, 25 April 2021, the fishing vessels KINGSTON and SAGA were pair trawling in Hanöbukten. The crew on board KINGSTON consisted of a captain and a deckhand. During the fishing operation, a fire broke out in the engine compartment that was situated below the wheelhouse.

The crew made one unsuccessful attempt to extinguish the fire using a powder extinguisher. The captain consequently decided that the crew would evacuate over to SAGA. Several rescue units, including the Swedish Coast Guard and the Swedish Sea Rescue Society, were alerted to the scene.

Due to the difficulties accessing the sources of the fire in the engine room, the firefighting mission was prolonged. After the fire was under control, KINGSTON was towed by SAGA to Nordersund while being escorted by the Coast Guard. The vessel was scrapped after the accident due to the extensive damages suffered.

The fire was probably caused by friction in one or several skidding V-belts in the engine room that overheated and ignited the wood interior. An underlying cause was that the risk of fire, and the consequences thereof had not been considered and managed at a sufficient level. A deficiency at a system level is the insufficient supervisory activity of the vessels that are included in the 5–15-metre segment.

Safety recommendations

SHK has decided not to issue any recommendation toward the shipowner based on the information that the fire-damaged vessel was scrapped after the accident.

SHK has previously issued several recommendations to the Swedish Transport Agency concerning deficiencies in compliances for commercial vessel in the segment of 5–15 metres within the nationwide shipping (see chapter 2.4). Therefore, the recommendations stated below should be managed in a context with the previously issued recommendations.

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

- Strengthening and streamlining the documentation controls and other inspection activities that are carried out on vessels are included in the requirements of the self-monitoring in the 5–15 metre segment (see section 2.4.1) (*RS 2022:04 R2*)
- Investigate and analyse if the information directed towards the shipowners operating vessels in the segment of 5–15 metres is perspicuous and appropriate in order to ensure systematic maritime safety work. The results from the survey should form the basis for potential improvements and clarifications of the guidance and other information aimed toward concerned shipowners (see section 2.4.2) (*RS 2022:04 R2*).