

This document is a translation of the original assessment in Swedish by SHK of the response to the recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the assessment.

The Swedish Maritime Administration

## **SHK's assessment of response to recommendations from the Swedish Maritime Administration**

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On 29 January 2019, the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) published its final report (RO 2019:01) regarding rescue operations involving the Swedish Maritime Administration's helicopters. In the report, SHK issued two safety recommendations to the Swedish Maritime Administration.

The Swedish Maritime Administration has responded to the safety recommendations and described the measures taken.

The first recommendation referred to taking measures to reduce the limitations of the helicopters' availability, which are due for example to crew members' recurrency and periods off duty and the planning of exercises and duty schedules (RO 2019:01 R5).

In its response, the Swedish Maritime Administration has indicated that the leave periods in the basic schedule have been reduced from 21 to 15 days. This means that when a person is absent for an entire service period, the downtime is reduced from 49 to 39 days.

SHK notes that the changed working schedule has likely reduced the downtime hours for the crews.

The Swedish Maritime Administration has also considered the possibility of planning crew duty periods so that they overlap for crew changes. However, to enable crews to exercise together before handing over a shift, more helicopters than are currently available would be required along with longer duty periods for the crews. The Swedish Maritime Administration has not found this to be justified. SHK notes that the issue is related to the safety recommendation that SHK has issued to the Government regarding a review of the need for helicopters and the level of staffing. In its response to that recommendation, the Government Offices (Ministry of Infrastructure) has stated that the matter will be brought up for further consideration within the Government Offices.

SHK notes that the Swedish Maritime Administration has taken certain measures and also considered further measures. In light of this, the recommendation can be considered implemented. (Closed – satisfactory response)

The second recommendation referred to the possibility of saving ORM forms, or parts thereof, in such a way that these can be used to improve planning, follow-up and analysis of the readiness of air-sea rescue services, while safeguarding the personal integrity of individual employees (RO 2019:01 R6).

In its report, SHK has underlined the function of the ORM forms as a risk management tool and emphasised the importance of safeguarding the personal integrity of individual employees. Even so, SHK made the assessment in its report that it could be valuable to use some of the information found in the ORM forms to improve planning, follow-up and analysis of the readiness of air-sea rescue services.

The Swedish Maritime Administration has chosen not to implement such a change but has, in accordance with SHK's recommendation, considered the possibility. The recommendation can therefore be considered implemented. (Closed – satisfactory response)

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