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Report RL 2000:23e

***Aircraft incident to aircraft G-BVJP
in the airspace above Östergötland,
E county, Sweden,
on the 28th of October 1999***

Case L-98/99

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Translated by Dennis Lynn Anderson
From the original Swedish at the request of the Board of Accident Investigation.

In case of discrepancies between the English and the Swedish texts, the Swedish text is to be considered the authoritative version.

2000-07-11

L-98/99

Swedish Civil Aviation Administration

601 79 NORRKÖPING

Report RL 2000: 23e

The Board of Accident Investigation (Statens haverikommission, SHK) has investigated an aircraft incident that occurred on 28 October 1999, in the airspace above Östergötland, E county, Sweden, involving an aircraft with registration G-BVJP.

In accordance with section 14 of the Ordinance on the Investigation of Accidents (1990:717) the Board herewith submits a final report on the investigation.

Ann-Louise Eksborg

Henrik Elinder

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Report finalised 2000-07-11

<i>Aircraft: registration, type</i>	G-BVJP , ATR-42-300
<i>Class/airworthiness</i>	Normal class, airworthy
<i>Owner/Operator</i>	Gill Aviation Limited
<i>Date and time</i>	1999-10-28, 17:20 hours in daylight <i>Note: All times in the report are Swedish normal time (SNT) = UTC + 1 hour</i>
<i>Place of occurrence</i>	In the airspace above Östergötland, E county, Sweden.
<i>Type of flight</i>	Scheduled flight
<i>Weather</i>	METAR ESGJ, 99-10-28, 17:20 hours: Wind 260°/15 knots, visibility >10 km., scattered clouds with cloud base at 2300 feet, QNH 1010 hPa
<i>Persons on board:</i> crew	2 + 1
passengers	43
<i>Injuries to persons</i>	None
<i>Damage to aircraft</i>	No damage
<i>Other damage</i>	None

The Board of Accident Investigation (SHK) was notified on the 28th of October 1999 that an aircraft with registration G-BVJP had an incident that same day at 17:20 hrs in the airspace above Östergötland, E county, Sweden.

The incident has been investigated by SHK represented by Ann-Louise Eksborg, Chairman, and Henrik Elinder, Chief investigator. The investigation was followed by Max Danielsson, Swedish Civil Aviation Administration.

History of the flight, etc.

The aircraft, belonging to Gill Aviation Limited in England, was leased by Braathens Malmö Aviation to fly Braathens' regular route BU887 from Stockholm/Arlanda airport to Jönköping airport. The crew from Gill Aviation consisted of an aircraft commander, a first officer, and a flight attendant, (so-called wet leasing). Aboard was also a purser from Braathens who was not qualified on the aircraft type, and who's only duty was to conduct the public address announcements to the passengers in the Swedish language. He was in uniform but did not have crew member status, but that of a passenger.

Approximately ten minutes after takeoff the flight attendant informed the captain that a white smoke had entered the cabin. Somewhat later, when the aircraft had levelled-out at flight level 100 (approximately 3050 meters above the ground), the aircraft smoke warning system was activated. According to the commander's written report, measures were then taken in accordance with the applicable emergency checklist. The commander then decided, due to safety reasons, to land at Linköping airport. Subsequently the aircraft was landed without problem and without any discomfort to the passengers. The passengers were later transported to Jönköping by bus.

The Swedish purser has stated that the information that they would be landing at the Linköping airport came without forewarning and concurrent with on-going food service in the cabin. The time available to retrieve the

food trays and prepare the cabin for landing was not sufficient. The purser felt himself to be forced to assist in this despite that he was not qualified on the aircraft type. In spite of this the cabin was not fully prepared when the landing took place. Among other things an emergency exit was partially blocked.

An aircraft technician from the company ascertained that the smoke in the cabin was probably caused by a minor oil leak in the left-hand motor. The day after the incident the aircraft was flown, without passengers, to England for trouble shooting and repairs. Before the aircraft departed Sweden a representative from Gill Aviation promised that the company would provide SHK with the necessary factual information so that SHK could investigate the incident. Despite several reminders from SHK, this information has not been forthcoming, thus a complete investigation has not been possible to achieve.

Conclusions

The lack of promised factual information has resulted in the fact that SHK has not been able to with certainty establish the cause of the smoke build-up in the cabin, but there is no reason to doubt that it was caused by the oil leakage that was observed in a motor after the incident.

SHK's investigation has instead been concentrated on the conditions of the actual leasing and the working situation in the cabin.

The leasing appears to have been undertaken according to applicable regulations and routines for so-called wet leasing. Even if it probably had no consequence upon the sequence of events, SHK notes that The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration's approval of the leasing expired on the 24th of September 1999 with the possibility of extension to the 25th of October 1999 and that therefore there was no valid leasing authorisation when the incident occurred.

When the commander decided to land immediately there was not sufficient time for the cabin attendant to prepare the cabin before the landing took place, which was serious from the standpoint of safety. It is difficult for SHK to judge whether the necessity of landing immediately was motivated. Any consultation with the cabin attendant as to the status of the cabin prior to the landing does not seem to have taken place, which can be considered a deficiency.

The peculiar situation also arose that in a critical situation two uniformed cabin crew members were on duty but only one of them had the authority to perform flight safety tasks. The circumstances where there are uniformed but unqualified personnel on duty in the cabin could involve, in a critical situation, that a passenger in need of help might not receive the help he or she asked for and expected, or that this help could be delayed.

Within The European Union work is presently under way to create a directive concerning the qualifications of cabin personnel. Also included in this work are elements that aim at what status and competence extra cabin personnel with purely service functions shall have.