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This document is a translation made by SHK of the original response in Swedish to the safety recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the response.

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The Swedish Transport Agency's report on how the recommendations RL 2019:12 R2 and RL 2019:12 R3 have been implemented

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

“Evaluate and consider whether AOC holders have prescribed appropriate procedures to monitor the crew members' knowledge of the limitations of conventional navigation aids. (See section 2.2).

(RS 2019:12 R2)”

The Swedish Transport Agency's evaluation and measures:

With the help of a survey (see appendix), the Swedish Transport Agency has gathered replies from 14 operators within various activities to questions regarding false ILS signals, and has subsequently evaluated these to consider the following measures.

The Swedish Transport Agency intends to:

... call on all operators to repeat the limitations in false ILS signals during their annual repetition training.

... call on all operators to, if possible, conduct practical training of the above in a simulator.

... call on all operators to emphasise the importance of compliance with the SOP, as all the surveyed operators replied that they have prescribed procedures in the SOP to ensure the avoidance of false signals.

The Swedish Transport Agency will also check that AOC holders have prescribed procedures and appropriate routines during supervision. (For example, checking manuals, supervision of ground training, checking OPC, etc.)

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

“Inform air traffic control providers about the risks of issuing an approach clearance at an early stage. (See chapter 2.1)

(RL 2019:12 R3)”

The Swedish Transport Agency intends to:

... inform all air traffic control providers of the risks entailed by issuing an approach clearance at too early a stage during the ANS seminar on 12 March 2020.

The decision in this matter was made by Head of Section Andreas Tapani. Also participating in the final processing of the matter were Flight Inspector Bengt Holmqvist from the airline section, ANS Inspector Christopher Montecinos from the air traffic control section and accident coordinator Peter Andersson, reporting.

Andreas Tapani

Head of Section
Section for Analysis

Appendix

Summary of survey responses:

1. Is the phenomenon of false localisers/glideslopes described in any of your manuals?

Here, around half the respondents say that it is described in OM-A and/or OM-B. Several respondents do not describe it as an explicit phenomenon at all.

2. Is it ever mentioned in conjunction with your initial/repeat training?

Here, most of the respondents indicate that it is not brought up explicitly, but that correctly establishing the localiser/glideslope is included. Several say that this is part of the basic training before receiving your CPL/ATPL.

3. Is there any method in your SOP that ensures the avoidance of false signals, such as callouts, FMA checks, etc.?

Here, all the respondents indicate that this is dealt with through the SOP and callouts. It is also included in the pre-flight briefing when verifying the IAL map.

4. Have you received any reports from crews experiencing false signals?

Here, all the respondents but 1 state that they have not received any such reports.