

Statens haverikommission Swedish Accident Investigation Authority

This document is a translation of the original assessment in Swedish by SHK of the response to the recommendation. In case of discrepancies between this translation and the Swedish original text, the Swedish text shall prevail in the interpretation of the assessment.

Dokumenttyp BREV Datum 11 December 2023 Er referens

Sida 1(2)Diarienr L 47/21

EASA investigation@easa.europa.eu

Information regarding ongoing safety recommendations

The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) published on 30 January 2023 the final report (SHK 2023:03) concerning an accident at Örebro Airport on 8 July 2021 related to parachute operations. The report provided five safety recommendations, two of which to EASA (SHK 2023:03 R1 and R2).

EASA was recommended to:

- Consider introducing formal training leading to a rating for pilots in parachute operations where the rating is maintained through refresher training (R1).
- Take measures to ensure that the oversight of non-commercial specialized • aviation activities within parachute operations is conducted in such a way and to such an extent that it has an effect on compliance with the regulatory framework and thus has a safety-enhancing effect (R2).

On 27 April 2023, EASA responded to the two recommendations. In the response, referred to as "intermediate response", EASA describes the ongoing work within the organization in regards to the recommendations. In its response, EASA essentially stated the following.

EASA has performed a Safety Issue Assessment (SIA) related to parachute operations. It concludes that the safety risk needs to be mitigated. Therefore, a Best Intervention Strategy (BIS) for parachute operations has been initiated. This process may result in risk mitigation actions related to rulemaking, safety promotion or any other suitable means. EASA also intends to launch a campaign in 2023 that will highlight the most common causes of accidents in skydiving operations. The campaign will highlight the most common causes of accidents and aims to spread knowledge and experience about operational procedures that contribute to mitigate high risks.

The response shows that the case within EASA has the status "open".

In the final report, flight operational deficiencies have been identified and the question has been raised as to whether it is reasonable to expect that every pilot who performs non-commercial flights in connection with parachute operation has sufficient tools to perform an appropriate risk analysis before each flight. The

Telefon/Phone +46 8 508 862 00 final report also shows that it has been difficult to clarify which pilots take part of information and safety campaigns of various kinds. Against this background, EASA has been recommended to consider introducing formal training leading to a rating for pilots in parachute operations where the rating is maintained through refresher training.

Furthermore, SHK has identified deficiencies in the oversight activities that have been taken regarding the non-commercial flight operations with parachutists. It cannot be excluded that these deficiencies also occur in other member states and EASA was therefore recommended to take measures to ensure that the oversight of non-commercial specialized flight operation activities within parachute operations is conducted in such a way and to such an extent that it has an effect on compliance with the regulatory framework and thereby has a safety-enhancing effect.

Statistics from EASA show that flying in parachute operation activities is associated with high risks and several fatal accidents have occurred in recent years. SHK therefore has a very positive view of the focus that safety issues linked to flight in parachute operations are now receiving within EASA. SHK also welcomes the measures that are now being taken. From the information provided by EASA so far, however, it is not possible to fully determine whether and, if so, how the specific recommendations directed at EASA will be met. It is therefore too early to make a final assessment of the safety recommendations.

SHK will follow the ongoing work within EASA and look forward to receive information about the continued process within EASA regarding the safety recommendations.

Best regards,

Jenny Ferm Chair Accident Investigations