Combat boat – grounding in Gothenburg archipelago

Summary in English

On the evening of 25 February 2025, an accident involving a Combat Boat 90 H occurred during a navigation exercise in the Gothenburg archipelago. The combat boat collided with a skerry and ran aground at high speed. Four people onboard were injured.

The accident happened during an exercise with conscripted students who were training to become combat boat operators. The exercise took place in darkness, using nautical charts and radar for navigation. Risks associated with the exercise were not adequately addressed, and no risk-reducing measures were taken considering the prevailing weather and darkness conditions.

The crew's knowledge and limited experience with the navigation system affected their ability to conduct the exercise safely.

The crew did not use seatbelts or helmets, which contributed to the severity of the injuries.

The rescue operation was complicated by an unclear command structure, which delayed the care of the injured.

Causes of the accident

The accident was caused by the fact that the difficulty level of the exercise had not been adjusted to the crew's capabilities and level of training.

Contributing factors to this were

• the course management did not communicate the objectives and required standards for the navigation practice clearly enough,
• that the objectives and requirements for the navigation practice were not communicated clearly enough,
• the crew did not conduct adequate risk assessments prior to the navigation exercise in question,
• the speed was not adjusted to the narrow passages of the waters and the prevailing weather conditions, and
• the navigator in question had limited experience with the navigation system used during the exercise.

A contributing factor to the extensive personal injuries was that the crew did not use seat belts and that helmets, which could have protected against head injuries, were lacking.

Safety recommendations

SHK submits the following recommendations:

The Swedish Armed Forces (through the Naval Staff) are recommended to:

• Conduct a review of the requirements and conditions for the use of seat belts in Combat Boat 90 H, (see Section 2.4.1). (SHK 2026:02 R1)
• Conduct a review of the use of helmets by personnel serving as crew members on Combat Boat 90 H, (see Section 2.4.2). (SHK 2026:02 R2)
• Develop routines to ensure that relevant medical equipment is available onboard when using Combat Boat 90 H, (see Section 2.4.3). (SHK 2026:02 R3)
• Review the emergency communication equipment on the combat boats, (see Section 2.6.1). (SHK 2026:02 R4)
• Conduct a renewed analysis of the functionality for retrieving data from the combat boat systems and subsequently take relevant measures, (see Section 2.7). (SHK 2026:02 R5)

The Swedish Armed Forces (through Amf 4) are also recommended to:

• Ensure that all conscripts have sufficient knowledge of the navigation systems used in the training, (see Section 2.3.1). (SHK 2026:02 R6)
• Conduct a renewed review of how the available time is utilized for practical naviga­tion training, (see Section 2.3.2). (SHK 2026:02 R7)
• Take measures to strengthen safety efforts in the training activities. This should also include reviewing the procedures for risk management in all operations involving Combat Boat 90 H, (see Section 2.5.1). (SHK 2026:02 R8)

The Swedish Maritime Administration is recommended to:

• Review the command structure for maritime rescue operations, focusing on on-site leadership, operation follow-up, and communication flows, (see Section 6.3). (SHK 2026:02 R9)