MARCO POLO - Grounding in Hanö bay

Summary

On 22 October 2023 the vessel MARCO POLO was en route from Trelleborg to Karlshamn. The planned route passed east of Hanö. During the voyage, the navigation equipment malfunctioned, and the vessel went off course. Rather than the planned route, the vessel entered shallow water between Hanö and the mainland. An initial grounding occurred at the shoal Laxören at 05:13 hrs, but the trip continued and eleven minutes later, the vessel ran aground again and was hard aground.

The two groundings caused extensive damage to the hull of the vessel and a major spill of heavy fuel oil in the northern part of Hanö Bay.

The crew did not initially realise that the vessel had run aground. This delayed the raising of the alarm and the rescue response. Assessment of the extent of the spill was also complicated by darkness and poor visibility.
The focus of the rescue response was initially on evacuating passengers from the vessel. Later the operation switched to focussing on responding to the environmental emergency, with the goal being to stop the spread of the heavy fuel oil that was leaking from the vessel. This took place both on sea and ashore. The environmental rescue response was protracted and complicated, and the large number of involved organisations placed significant demands on the cooperation between these organisations. The rescue response was also further complicated by difficult weather conditions and uncertainties regarding the vessel's salvage. A week after the grounding, the ship drifted off the shoal and subsequently ran aground a third time, which caused the release of more heavy fuel oil, from already damagedtanks.

On 2 November, eleven days after the first grounding, it finally became possible to tow the vessel into Stilleryd harbour in Karlshamn. The individual rescue response measures were generally implemented effectively. However, the investigation shows that there were deficiencies, including in the communication between the organisations involved, the handling and sharing of information ahead of decision-making about rescue response measures, central government support and during supervision of the salvage by the authorities. The deficiencies delayed the rescue operations, and the consequences of the grounding likely worsened. The investigation has also identified several legal challenges, which highlight a need to review the societal ability to manage significant vessel incidents.

Causes of the accident

Safety recommendations

Affected stakeholders have taken several measures. In terms of deficiencies identified in the investigation which have already been addressed by such measures, SHK has not made any recommendations.

The Swedish Government is recommended to:
• Investigate how society’s ability to deal with major shipping accidents can be enhanced. The investigation should, among other things, review the roles and responsibilities of the organisations concerned and the potential to share geographic information, as well as clarify responsibilities for the clean-up of oil following a shipping accident. An investigation of this nature should also include measures that can reduce the risk of shipping accidents due to disruptions or interruptions of GNSS.

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:
• Produce methods that the agency can apply to ensure that measures in salvage plans are implemented, and compose procedures for rapidly making and executing decisions concerning mandatory measures.

The Swedish Maritime Administration is recommended to:
• Ensure that the JRCC, at an early stage, contacts the emergency responders ashore who may need to assist in a maritime search and rescue. Where possible, this contact should be made in direct conjunction with a decision concerning a maritime search and rescue operation, in order to facilitate a dialogue about the need for measures at an early stage.

• Promote an update of the information in international sailing directions to ensure that it is clearly indicated that Hanö Sound is categorized as internal waters and is therefore subject to compulsory pilotage.

TT-Line GmbH & Co. KG is recommended to:
Take action to ensure safe navigation and that emergency situations are managed in an adequate manner by:
• Improving procedures for watch handover on the bridge.

• Further developing the navigation procedures and ensure that they are complied with.

• Ensuring that the bridge officers have sufficient knowledge of the navigation systems.

• Improving the crew’s knowledge of the safety management system.

• Ensuring that the crew receive sufficient training in emergency scenarios so that they are able to quickly identify and manage an emergency situation that arises.

• Revising its procedures to further improve support to the vessel in the event of various emergency scenarios.