VALARÖ – fire in engine room, outside Strömstad

Summary in English

On 18 April 2025, a fire broke out on board the fishing vessel VALARÖ during the transport of shellfish from Strömstad to Rossö, Västra Götaland County. On board the fishing vessel were the captain, a deckhand, and three passengers. Just over fifteen minutes after departure, the crew noticed the smell of smoke and opened the engine room hatch, which was located in the wheelhouse, to investigate the cause. When the hatch was opened, thick smoke poured out and the wheelhouse quickly became engulfed in flames. Several nearby vessels saw the fire, including the passenger vessel KOSTERVÅG, which alerted the Swedish Maritime Administration’s Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC). The crew and passengers were able to evacuate safely to a leisure craft that came to their aid.

The rescue operation was initiated quickly. The Coast Guard vessel KBV 310 arrived within ten minutes and began extinguishing the fire with the vessel’s water cannon. The Sea Rescue Society and the fire and rescue service joined about fifteen minutes later. Firefighters with breathing apparatus boarded VALARÖ and confirmed that the fire had been extinguished. The vessel was then towed back to Strömstad.

The accident resulted in extensive material damage to the vessel, but thanks to swift action, injuries and environmental impact were avoided. The investigation has revealed deficiencies in supervision, self-inspection, and safety equipment. The incident highlights the need for improved routines for fire protection and supervision on smaller commercial vessels.

Causes of the accident

The direct cause of the fire in the engine room could not be determined, other than that it most likely started due to a fault in the electrical system.

The reason the fire was able to develop and spread was that the vessel lacked safety equipment for both early detection and suppression of an engine room fire. The underlying factors for this deficiency were that the company did not have any safety management system for its operations.

At the system level, it is a deficiency that the Swedish Transport Agency’s supervision of fishing vessels subject to self-inspection requirements in the 5–15 metres segment is insufficient. Additional factors are the lack of knowledge and resources among smaller shipping companies to update and modernize older vessels so that they meet the standards now generally in force.

Safety recommendations

Vågskär Fésk (the shipping company) is recommended to:

• Develop a systematic maritime safety management system for its current operations and vessels, see section 3.5.

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:
• Investigate and analyse which oversight measures are most appropriate to achieve an acceptable level of maritime safety for fishing vessels that are subject to self-inspection requirements in the 5–15 metres segment, and, if necessary, develop and adapt the oversight methods based on the results of this investigation, as well as extend the scope of the oversight see section 3.6.1.

• Investigate and analyse whether the information directed to shipowners at the
5–15 metres vessel segment is sufficiently clear and appropriately tailored to ensure systematic maritime safety management. The results of this investigation should serve as a basis for any improvements and clarifications in the guidance and other information provided to the relevant shipowners, see section 3.6.2.

• Evaluate the actual safety-enhancing effects of the current training and, if necessary, take measures to ensure that the training effectively contributes to improved maritime safety on small fishing vessels, see section 3.6.3.