Date of occurrence:
S-128/25
MESHKA – grounding off Landskrona
Summary
On 31 May 2025, the bulk carrier MESHKA was transiting southbound through the Sound (Öresund) on a voyage from Tarragona in Spain to Vysotsk in Russia. The vessel was in ballast. The crew were navigating using an electronic chart and navigation system that lacked detailed chart coverage of the Sound. Only a small-scale chart cell was installed in the system. The route through the Sound was planned directly across a shoal area off Landskrona. During the passage, the bridge team also failed to notice that several navigational marks they passed were missing from the electronic charts onboard.
The ship reporting system in the Sound (SOUNDREP) only contacted the vessel once it had already entered shallow water, at which point grounding was unavoidable. The grounding resulted in only minor damage. The vessel was refloated after discharging ballast and being towed, and was subsequently able to continue its voyage.
The accident can also be viewed in the context of an increasing trend in which many vessels are passing through the Sound for the first time, with crews lacking previous experience of the area. This was also the first time MESHKA and her crew had transited the Sound. This places particularly high demands on voyage planning being carried out and reviewed thoroughly.
Causes of the accident
The accident was caused by inadequate voyage planning. As a result, the ECDIS used by the bridge officers for navigation lacked detailed chart cells (ENC) for the Öresund. Contributing factors included:
• the bridge officers’ insufficient knowledge of the ECDIS and its limitations
• deficiencies in adherence to the vessel’s navigation procedures
• shortcomings in bridge teamwork and lookout procedures
• delayed intervention by the ship reporting system.
The underlying causes of the accident were deficiencies in the company’s implementation of the safety management system and its adherence on board, as well as shortcomings in the chart ordering process.
Safety recommendations
The shipping company Makareb Shipmanagement DMCC is recommended to:
• ensure that the vessel’s crew have sufficient knowledge of the safety management system and that the existing procedures and checklists are used correctly .
The ECDIS manufacturer Danelec is recommended to:
• inform ECDIS users of the limitation and update the information in the manual.
The chart provider Elcome is recommended to:
• take measures to clarify when available chart cells (ENC) have been deselected along a planned route.
The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:
• consider whether there is reason to promote the implementation of international regulation imposing requirements on chart supplier software.
Kristina Börjevik Kovaniemi
Björn Ramstedt
Page information
- Last updated:
- 15 June 2026
